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0. Introduction 
 
In Labor Economics from a Free Market Perspective: Employing the 
Unemployable (2008) Walter Block presents a seemingly comprehensive free 
market perspective on the economics of the labor market. From this 
perspective Block discusses the economics of wage determination and the 
minimum wage’s effects on the labor market; the economic impact of labor 
unions and unionized regulation as well as the economics of unemployment 
insurance and academic tenure; and he touches on immigration, 
redistributive justice, and slavery reparations. There should be no surprise 
that the free market perspective allows Block to argue that regulation and 
intervention in the market cause imbalances and disequilibria and are 
therefore economically inefficient and undesireable. But Block goes one step 
further and argues that all kinds of regulation or tampering with a free 
market setting for voluntary interaction of individuals are simply wrong. 
There is no doubt that Labor Economics from a Free Market Perspective is a 
very provocative book. 
On the one hand, it is a treatise on labor economics covering basic economic 
truths such as the determination of wages and the effects in the labor market 
of enforced minimum wage laws and unionism. Just like in Block’s 1976 book 
Defending the Undefendable, from which the sub title “Employing the 
Unemployable” seems to be borrowed, the author investigates well-known 
institutions and offers thought-provoking arguments based on distinctly 
economic reasoning. The difference is that Block does not pick heavily 
disliked social phenomena to which he offers strong arguments in favor, 
which is the case in Defending the Undefendable, but argues fiercely against 
generally accepted and commonly advocated political solutions to perceived 
market problems. Even though many of the arguments are true from a 
mainstream economics point of view, most of the illustrative examples and 
analogies to complement them are, in a typically Blockian manner, very 
outspoken, shocking, and – sometimes – even infuriating. 
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On the other hand, Labor Economics from a Free Market Perspective is far 
from a neutral and wertfrei theoretical study of economic phenomena 
accompanied by solutions based on pure economic reasoning. It is a treatise 
with a distinct ideological base: it is hard-core libertarian, a view that, in its 
intrepid advocacy for unbridled individual liberty, itself should prove 
provocative to most people. This radical perspective literally permeates the 
book’s chapters and, combined with Block’s obvious fancy for taking coat-
trailing standpoints, it leaves no reader unperturbed. 
The author does not try to hide the fact that the book takes a clear value-
based position. Contrarily, in the introduction Block explicitly states that it 
is “an ideological book” but that this, to the author, does not mean the 
approach is unscientific but only that it “takes a position on ideas” (p. xix). 
The position is explicit already in the title of the book and is further stressed 
in the introduction, where the author declares that the book “look[s] at 
numerous labor market issues from a vantage point of free enterprise or 
libertarianism” and that a “cure” to the problems discussed is available 
through “private property rights, the non-aggression principle and the law of 
free association” (p. xix). 
An opponent to libertarianism and free markets would, as would economists 
and other representatives for the “positive sciences,” find plenty of reasons to 
criticize Block. It is safe to say that the bulk of such criticism would target 
the ideologically based perspective the author has chosen, and that such 
critique would be based on the seemingly obvious contradiction between 
science and ideology. In this paper, however, I will argue that the “obvious” 
contradiction need not be contradictory at all. From a radically libertarian 
point of view it can be argued that the “is-ought problem” is partially solved, 
or at least inapplicable, and therefore that criticism based on “Hume’s Law” 
may be misdirected. This is not to say, however, that Block cannot be 
criticized for the assumed ideological perspective on which his economic 
arguments are supposedly based. 
In the remainder of this paper, I continue to analyze the essence of Block’s 
argument from what I suspect is a somewhat unexpected angle: I criticize the 
scope of his arguments, and especially his conclusions and underlying 
assumptions and reasons, adopting the radically libertarian or free-market 
point of view – the very same view championed and utilized by Block. 
 
1. Hume’s Law and the Libertarian Idea 
 
David Hume (1739-1740) famously identified that there is a significant and 
important difference between descriptive (“is”) and prescriptive (“ought”) 
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statements. He advised against deriving an “ought” from an “is,” i.e., to 
draw normative conclusions based on empirical facts, without clearly 
explaining exactly how employed ought-statements follow from is-
statements. Hume is often assigned the position that there is no solution to 
the “is-ought problem,” and this so-called Hume’s Law (that “ought” cannot 
be derived from “is”) is often used to clearly distinguish between and 
separate positive (empirical) science from normative (ethics).  
Block’s “ideological book” seems to clearly violate Hume’s Law in that it 
argues from a point of view of libertarianism (i.e., libertarian ethics) using 
primarily arguments from a distinctly positive science, namely economics. As 
has already been noted, however, this may not necessarily be a correct 
interpretation of Block’s position and arguments. There are two reasons for 
this: firstly, Block is an economist in the Austrian tradition (see e.g. Block, 
1999), which means he bases the argument on praxeological reasoning (Mises, 
1949; Rothbard, 1962) rather than “mainstream” economic techniques; and 
secondly, libertarianism as an ideology is often portrayed as an open-ended 
and tolerant “system” that sets a non-restrictive formal framework but refuses 
to provide a social blueprint, which makes it less normative than most 
ideologies. As we shall see, free markets and libertarianism may not be 
different in substance or nature but only in approach or perspective. 
The free market is the starting point in economic analysis and very often 
the “ideal” in terms of market efficiency. Market equilibrium theory, which is 
a cornerstone in mainstream economic analysis, shows maximum resource 
utilization in terms of production (supply) and, as a consequence, satisfaction 
of consumer wants (demand). In other words, economic theory strives to find 
the most efficient means to certain ends given an explicit amount of resources 
(inputs) and specific production functions (technologies) in a particular 
market. In this sense, therefore, economics as a scientific discipline is founded 
on a utilitarian philosophy of what is universally good (efficiency) and can 
therefore make claims as to what is a “better”1 solution, even though the 
                                                
1 “Better” should here be interpreted in the strictly economic sense, i.e. “more efficient 
[use of resources].” The science of economics is based on the seemingly utilitarian idea that 
“efficient” is better than “inefficient” because of the greater possibility of satisfaction of 
consumer wants/demand, and therefore that increases in utility are strictly better than 
decreases. See e.g. the economics concept “Pareto improvement,” which describes a 
change in which no individual is affected negatively in terms of utility and at least one 
individual is “better off” (Pareto, 1971). In this sense, economics claims not only to 
explain and predict economic phenomena but to provide a [normative] basis for decision-
making. 
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explicit questions it tries to answer and the phenomena it tries to describe 
and explain are more scientific in the positive sense. 
Economics in general, and especially the Austrian tradition, is deductive 
in nature and as such guided by a certain set of assumptions of e.g. the 
rationality of economic actors. Austrian economics consists of a complex set 
of detailed economic truths derived from the “action axiom,” which states 
that humans take conscious action toward chosen goals. It is wertfrei in that 
it explains the functions and workings of the market and its institutions, and 
attempts to explain effects of certain changes in and to the market, such as 
entrepreneurship and production choices in the first sense and regulations 
and taxes in the latter. 
Just like most other approaches to economics, the Austrian school does not 
propose or advocate an “ideal” setting or structure for the economic system. 
On the contrary, it relies significantly less on equilibrium analysis in its study 
of the market than e.g. mainstream economics. However, Austrian economics 
rejects statistical methods and empirical studies as means to learn about 
economic truths and hence adopts a purely deductive approach. As such, it 
does not refine or change its explanations and theories to “fit” empirical data 
(as is the case in “semi-deductive” mainstream economic research) and 
therefore it tends to maintain the truth of fundamental economic theory: 
that all interventions are necessarily and without exception regarded as 
causes of inefficiencies or distortions imposed on the economy.2 True to form, 
Block’s arguments throughout the book are directly aimed at these causes of 
inefficiencies: intervention in and regulation of the free market. 
It follows from the statement above that the only state of the economy 
without distorted outcomes and inefficiencies is a market free from 
interference. Thus, even though Austrian economics is not in itself 
normative, it clearly shows the strictly negative effects of interventions in the 
market place, which inevitably provides individuals of certain moral 
convictions the arguments and moral reasons to espouse an unrestricted 
market process. There is therefore, to a certain degree, a possible link 
between the purely scientific study of the market/economy and the 
normative advocacy of unregulated/free markets. 
The normative view supporting free markets as well as, or perhaps primarily, 
free people is often denoted libertarianism or libertarian ethics. As we have 
seen, libertarianism is the explicit “vantage point” of Block’s study of labor 
                                                
2 Any and all restrictions of the market process can be shown to cause e.g. inefficiencies 
through discouraging profitable investments or encouraging “too risky” investments.  
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economics, which makes its definition and implications highly relevant to our 
discussion on a possible violation of Hume’s Law.  In Block’s own words 
(1994:117, emphasis in original):  
 
“Libertarianism is a political philosophy. It [is] concerned solely with the 
proper use of force. Its core premise is that it should be illegal to threaten or 
initiate violence against a person or his property without his permission; 
force is justified only in defense or retaliation.”  
 
This is clearly a prescriptive definition of the political philosophy 
libertarianism, and as such it should violate the aforementioned law. But this 
is not necessarily the case. We have already seen that economics as a science 
and especially its use of the “free market” equilibrium is not perfectly 
descriptive but includes prescriptive elements; more specifically, economics is 
the study of the economy using the free market as benchmark. Since 
libertarian philosophy, using Block’s definition above, is concerned only with 
“the proper use of force” we need only investigate whether this “libertarian 
law” is compatible with the scientific study of the market.  
Any ideology is by definition normative and therefore so is libertarianism. 
However, as was previously mentioned, it is much less so than competing 
ideologies in that it insists on a “non aggression principle” as a necessary and 
sufficient condition of liberty but does not predict nor prescribe the nature of 
liberty. The principle itself states only that “everyone may act precisely as he 
pleases, provided, only, that he does not initiate violence against non 
aggressors”3 (Block, 2008:xix), and is therefore a definition of the necessary 
limits of freedom (cf. the Hobbesian state of nature in which no such legal 
limits to freedom exists).  
As “libertarian law” states only that people are free to act and associate as 
they choose for as long as they do not initiate the use of physical force, a 
number of ideological utopias should be obtainable within that framework 
and therefore, in a weak sense, compatible with libertarianism. In other 
words, libertarianism is not exclusive in the sense that it excludes other-than-
libertarian ways of life or organization (cf. Nozick, 1974), and therefore does 
not make claims for how people should lead their lives. It only limits 
                                                
3 The non-aggression principle is not exclusively libertarian, but is an important part of 
the so-called “natural law” tradition in which it can be traced back to St. Thomas Aquinas 
or even Epicurus.   
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individuals’ actions to anything that does not do direct harm to other 
individuals. 
This is very similar to the definition of the free market, where nothing 
supposedly restricts the competitive market process from bringing the 
quantity demanded by consumers and the quantity supplied by producers 
into equilibrium. A market where force exists, i.e. where contracts are 
breached and property rights violated, would rarely be denoted “free” – the 
use of force is not compatible with the voluntary exchange of goods and 
services. As we have already noted, economics, and especially Austrian 
economics, studies and predicts the negative effects of interventions in the 
market place. Interventions are any forceful changes to or restrictions of 
economic actors’ behavior, which necessarily includes the initiation of 
physical force. The free market, therefore, is fundamentally based on a 
principle that is very similar, or even identical, to libertarian law. Also, 
libertarianism, based on the non aggression principle, cannot espouse any 
other economic “system” than a free market economy – all alternative ways 
of economic organizing would necessarily violate the fundamental principle. 
The free market and libertarianism are therefore, in substance, two sides of a 
coin: one cannot exist without [a version of] the other.  
But this does not imply that the free market is libertarianism, or vice 
versa, even though they share fundamental properties both in theory and 
“practice.” The difference lies not in substance, but in use and perspective of 
the concept. The former is a description of the unrestrained market whereas 
the latter is an image of a potential “good” society where nothing is allowed 
to restrict the market (in a broad sense, i.e. including basically any human 
interaction). Both concepts are therefore identical to the extent that they 
describe a state of unrestricted voluntary interaction, but different in 
underlying purpose. It is therefore wrong to claim that the free market is 
libertarian, whereas it would be correct to claim that libertarianism 
champions and includes the free market. The perspective and purpose, 
therefore, while not substance, of the free market concept is primarily 
positive and scientific, whereas for libertarianism it is normative. 
Block is hence correct in that adopting a libertarian point of view in the 
study of the labor market does not compromise the scientific nature of the 
economic argument. But only to the extent that his libertarianism does not 
affect economic conclusions or distort facts and arguments through applying 
a distinctly libertarian perspective where such is inapplicable; the free market 
is an economic model of “ideal” (optimal/maximum) efficiency, but 
libertarianism is not. In other words, the study’s scientific value is limited to 
the extent that the libertarianism in Block’s argument is strictly the use of 
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the non aggression principle to explain, describe and define the free market. 
Hume’s Law is violated only when and where Block’s libertarian views are 
used in an explicitly normative manner, i.e. when libertarianism is used 
specifically as a libertarian ethics in addition to the voluntary nature of the 
free market. 
It should therefore be concluded that an “ideological book” such as 
Block’s should not automatically be dismissed as unscientific due to its 
ideological vantage point. Even though the vocabulary of choice in many of 
the articles is clearly libertarian, Block generally manages to stay on the 
right side of the road from a science point of view. His arguments are 
economically correct and straightforwardly presented; there is no obvious 
flaw in the logic and he gives the reader no reason to doubt the validity of the 
argument; economists would find it difficult to criticize Block’s strictly 
economic reasoning. They would first, however, have to see through Block’s 
provocative language and somewhat unorthodox examples. 
 
 
2. An Ideological Analysis 
 
But from a libertarian ideological point of view the author is not as safe from 
criticism. From a radical libertarian perspective the issues discussed by Block 
are both interesting and important, but the depth of the analysis of such 
intervention in the labor market is insufficient – the analysis is too limited 
and does not take into account all major effects of market regulation. I will 
here use section II in the book (“Unions”) as an example, but the same line of 
reasoning is applicable on most arguments put forth in the book.  
The starting point for Block’s analysis is, as has already been discussed at 
length, the non aggression axiom as a distinguishing property of the free 
market. In Block’s interpretation, the analysis is primarily from a point of 
view of freedom, a concept which has a distinctly normative flavor. By 
freedom Block means the rule of libertarian law and therefore non-violation 
of the non aggression principle – the absence of violence and coercion. 
We have already shown that the concept of freedom as a distinctly 
libertarian ethics is necessarily normative, and that Block’s claim to do the 
analysis from the perspective of freedom would therefore violate Hume’s 
Law. But we have also concluded that the analysis is not in violation of the 
aforementioned law. The reason for this is that Block does not predominantly 
provide arguments from a point of view of freedom – despite his claim to do 
so – but provides arguments distinctly targeted at violent action as 
interference in the market place. Libertarian freedom might be Block’s 
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underlying purpose and ideal, but the arguments are above all against certain 
instances of violent intervention in the market and not pro libertarianism per 
se. In the analysis of labor unions this fact is made explicit when that which 
is analyzed is only the coercive aspect of unionism – “we are defining unions 
as organizations that use coercive force” (Block, 2008:62) – while the non-
coercive aspect is disregarded (as is “the other side” of the story: any 
employer-inflicted coercion of labor workers). 
Understood as an argument against the use of violence or physical force, 
whether or not sanctioned by state laws, the book provides a good overview 
of the inefficiencies arising due to a number of restrictions imposed on the 
labor market. In the case of labor unionism Block rightfully goes after the 
artificial increase in wages brought about through unions’ [legal] threats of 
violence against employers – and the inevitable negative effects thereof. True 
to the economic analysis, Block argues that “unions cannot raise real wages, 
only distort them” and that “[u]nions are […] notorious for undermining 
management’s ability to do its job, which is to increase efficiency” 
(2008:100). 
He also points to the fact that labor unions do not only act in the interest 
of labor workers against employers, but that there are strong incentives for 
union leaders, due to their privileged position, to “not only want higher 
wages for their members” but also “to squeeze every resource of the employer 
in order to make their union more attractive to prospective dues payers” 
(2008:103). The coercive labor union therefore distorts the labor market more 
than a general raise in wage rates would (without an equivalent increase in 
productivity), through adding incentives that ultimately will force employers 
to bear costs of union benefits and “marketing.” 
Even if it were the case that labor unions would act primarily as 
representatives of labor workers in conflicts with employers, it is argued that 
“[t]his is a very inefficient and costly way to settle problems which should 
never exist in the first place” (ibid). These conflicts would not exist in the free 
market, Block argues, since they arise due to labor unions pushing wages 
“above the level that a competitive free market would have brought through 
supply and demand” (2008:99), to which management “must respond by 
cutting back on production in order to minimize costs” (2008:103). 
Block frequently falls back to almost a market equilibrium-based 
argument, using the free market as benchmark, against the coercive 
interference in the labor market – labor unions cause distortions through 
forcing employers to pay higher wages and undermining firm and production 
management’s efforts to increase productivity and efficiency. It is an 
economic truth that “[w]ages and working conditions aren’t set by firms” 
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(2008:111) but is determined solely, at least in the long run, by the 
productivity of each individual person in the market. Block’s argument is no 
doubt firmly based in sound economics; as all economists know, in the 
competitive free market real wages depend only upon the productivity of 
labor, which means that the only way of increasing real wages is to increase 
productivity. 
The problem is here that Block seems to partly forget the perspective he 
claims to have adopted in the analysis: libertarianism. Economists regularly 
analyze the effects of changes through holding all relevant variables but the 
one being studied constant; they normally use simplified models in which a 
single variable can be compared and contrasted with the benchmark 
equilibrium. Libertarians, on the other hand, guided by a libertarian ethics, 
would not find a strictly economic analysis satisfactory since it is too limited 
in scope and therefore would easily fail to notice important but “hidden” 
aspects and indirect causes of the problem; from a libertarian point of view 
the existing labor market is so far from being a free market that it is simply 
impossible to surmise that the distortions are the result only or for the most 
part of labor unions and union-sponsored, union-supportive regulations.  
Murray Rothbard, a leading economist and political theorist in the 
libertarian tradition as well as in Austrian economics (and frequently cited by 
Block), has stated that a true libertarian is guided by “a passion for justice” 
and that such a passion requires “a set of ethical principles of justice and 
injustice which cannot be provided by utilitarian economics” (Rothbard, 
1966:6). With Rothbard, therefore, we must conclude that the Blockian 
analysis once again falls short of being a manifestly libertarian analysis – it is 
primarily an economic analysis. 
Even though a libertarian analysis would have no problem incorporating 
Block’s conclusions, libertarians guided by a passion for justice would claim 
there is a much deeper and systemic problem than simply the existence of 
labor unions and the violence they make use of in the labor market. From a 
libertarian point of view there is as much of an “injustice” problem on the 
“other side” of the conflict: employers are not solely victims of unionized, 
state-sanctioned violence – they are also beneficiaries of a multitude of 
regulations. They may not normally use direct violent action against hired 
workers, but they are certainly not perfectly without blame. Corporations 
and employers enjoy state-sanctioned privileges in the market place just like 
labor unions. It is simply not the case that unions are villains and employers 
are not – they are both crooks, but in different ways and perhaps of differing 
degrees. 
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The problem from an economic point of view is here that corporations 
seem much more regulated at first glance, since labor unions enjoy obvious 
legal privileges and “labor protection” is explicitly and frequently advocated 
in political discourse. The common rhetoric used by political decision-makers 
and interest groups is almost without exception to the benefit of the worker – 
against “powerful” corporations in a hopeless David and Goliath kind of 
situation. It is therefore easy to assume that regulations are introduced as an 
attempt to politically strengthen laborers to balance the perceived “market 
power” of employers.  
But regulations are as frequently to the benefit of employers. Regulations 
raise barriers of entry that protect existing actors in markets; taxes force 
increases to the working population (which pushes wages down) through 
making it impossible to afford choosing not to work; government investments 
in infrastructure and technology act as indirect subsidies to corporations; and 
the political system provides opportunities for corporations to “buy” their 
own laws from politicians eager to enrich themselves or gain support for 
reelection. These are all examples of interventions with direct effect in the 
labor market, but they are not as easily recognized as union violence. From a 
radically libertarian perspective they must be deemed at least as important 
and destructive as the effect of labor unions and union laws; libertarianism 
does not discriminate between different forms of injustice – all initiation of 
violence is equally illegitimate and immoral (Rothbard, 1982). 
A radically libertarian view could identify a long list of interventions in 
the labor market that makes it fundamentally unfree and the points on the 
list would be to the benefit and detriment to literally every actor in the 
market. Labor unions are to blame for the harm they do, but it is hardly the 
case that the market would function as a free market were only labor unions 
and union laws dropped from the equation. The libertarian conclusion would 
be that even if all the interventions analyzed by Block were removed, the 
market would still not to a large degree resemble a free market. The 
violations by or on behalf of firms and employers are absent from Block’s 
analysis of the labor market – it seems to be guided by a one-eyed passion for 
justice. 
To reinstate the free market and its institutions, libertarians would argue 
that all initiation of violence need be eliminated – systemic, formal, 
institutionalized and informal alike. And, as Block surely knows, for any 
market to be truly free it is necessary to abolish government.  
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3. Summarizing Assessment 
 
Labor Economics from a Free Market Perspective is a provocative book: it is 
too libertarian to be an economics treatise while too firmly based in economic 
theory to be a libertarian exposition. As a libertarian anthology it is too 
limited in scope and “passion” to be a comprehensive investigation of the 
effects of aggressive violence in the labor markets, and as an economics work 
it is too polemical and provocative and “ideological” to be taken seriously by 
mainstream economists. So what is its place in the literature on labor 
economics? 
It is hard to say exactly how to label this book, but it certainly fills a void 
in the intersection between economic and libertarian theory. In a sense, it 
proves that economic theory need not be as rigidly positive and lifelessly 
wertfrei as economists tend to believe – it is possible, and perhaps favorable, 
for economists to have a strong value-based motivation while carrying out 
economic scientific studies. Fundamental motivations for research are always 
and necessarily value-based, which means full disclosure of the scientist’s 
value base would only provide explicit context for understanding, analyzing 
and criticizing the research – and the reasons for it. By being explicitly 
libertarian, Block does the reader a favor that economists generally seem 
determined not to.  
This point is even stronger considering chapter 17, where Block recites a 
statement in support of the minimum wage signed by more than 650 
prominent economists including Nobel Prize laureates. Unambiguously, 
economics shows that minimum wage laws only lead to unemployment and 
worsening of working conditions; in Block’s words, “[e]very Basic Economics 
101 textbook […] make this basic elementary point” (2008:160). The reason 
for the signatories to support this petition despite the obvious economic 
truths must therefore be normative – if these economists would have followed 
Block’s example and disclosed their personal value based perspective, their 
signing of the petition would have been less befuddling. (Of course, the 
political intent would then be all too obvious.) 
Judging from the signatories of the petition, the basic economic truths 
that Block recapitulates using his characteristically fearless approach and 
outspoken mode of expression obviously need repeating. And doing so with a 
distinctly libertarian flavor through explicitly focusing on market 
interventions as violence is refreshing and thought provoking. Even though it 
seems unintended, Block manages to prove that economic theory is generally 
compatible with libertarian political and moral theory without compromising 
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with the economic argument – and he shows that economics can indeed 
provide a strong argument for libertarianism.  
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